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National Political Influence and the Catholic Church
Jennifer Nash
Previous literature has focused on the political importance ofthe Catholic Church within
democratic transitions, while little research has followed the role ofthe Church in post
transitional settings. The present research acknowledges a marked variation in the
political influence among the national Churches ofPoland, Brazil, Hungary and Spain
following the institution ofdemocracy. Within the national context, the Church's
religious mission, the association ofthe Church with the former regime and the influence
ofthe International Catholic Church emerge as explanatory factors.

Democratic transitions have become a topic of great discussion among political
scholars in recent years with what seems to be a domino effect of democratization
beginning in Latin America in the 1970s and continuing in Eastern Europe in the late
1980s. In many of these transitions the Catholic Church I has played a crucial role as the
protector of civil society during periods of communist and right-wing authoritarian rule,
as well as taking an active role in promoting the establishment of democracy (Bruneau,
1994; Levine, 1980; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Perez-Diaz, 1993; Ramet, 1987). While the
Church's political role in transition is important, significantly fewer scholars have
explored how democracy has affected the Catholic Church within the national context
(Eberts, 1998; Ramet, 1999; Vilarino and Tizon, 1998). Even fewer have attempted
cross-national comparisons of the Church, thus permitting generalizations to be made
regarding the political influence of the Church since the institution of democratic
governance (Casanova, 1990 and 1993; Gill, 1998).
With the establishment of democracy, one would expect the Church to flourish. In
many instances the Church was the only organized body capable of exerting political
authority within a burgeoning democratic society. However, using abortion policy
disputes as an indicator of the Church's political influence, it is clear the cases of Spain,
Brazil, Hungary and Poland vary extensively. The Polish Church has maintained the
most political influence followed by Brazil, Hungary and Spain (Neilsen, 1991; Volenski
I Throughout this paper when referring to the Church, I am alluding to the Catholic Church within a
national context. When referring to the Catholic Church's international hierarchy, I will refer to either the
Vatican or the International Church.
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and Gryzmala-Mosczynska, 1997; Gautier, 1998; Casanova, 1993; Linz, 1991; Morris,
1993). In the Brazilian and Polish cases, the Church played an instrumental role in the
democratic revolution, making a political decline in the Church almost inconceivable.
While initially these Churches exerted great political influence, questions arise as to why
their influence has gradually declined since the inauguration of democracy.

Political Influence of the Church

The influence of a given Church is defined by the Church's ability to achieve
certain moral and political objectives within specific policy areas. The Churches included
in this study have differed in the policy disputes they have chosen to engage. In
Hungary, the Church in the post-communist period has clashed with the government over
levels of religious funding and the restitution of religious lands. The Brazilian Church
has been active within the realm of social policy. All ofthe Churches, however, prefer
policies that restrict abortion. Only some are able to achieve or maintain restrictive
policies. Abortion policy is an effective indicator for determining the political clout
assigned to each case because the Catholic Church is fundamentally opposed to induced'
abortion of any kind. In April 1999 the Vatican went so far as to condemn the distribution
of emergency contraception by United Nations agencies to Kosovo refugees who had
been raped (A Church Disguised, 1999). In terms of influence, if a restrictive law is in
place the Church will, in most instances, not exert itself politically unless there is a
challenge to the law. In countries where a more permissive abortion law exists, this is
telling of the Church's inability to influence policy in a direct, concrete manner. The
following table illustrates this idea.
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Sept. 22, 1998 liberalized abortion bill sought to allow an abortion if "severe
personal, family, or social conflict within the ftrst twelve weeks of pregnancy"
172 favored, 173 opposed, 1 abstained (Bosch, 1998)
Currently abortion allowed in cases of rape, fetal malformation, or danger to
mother's health (mental or physical)
Passed under Socialist majority Oct. 6, 1983-186 favored, 109 opposed
Dec. 17, 1993 Hungarian parliament offtcially sanctioned country's abortion
practices, allowing women abortions when it presented a risk to her health or in
cases of rape or if other "weighty social considerations" (normally financial) are
accepted by a committee
Public abortion debate 1990-92 because the Supreme Court ruled the right to
life was safeguarded by Hungarian Constitution. Court mandated parliament to
decide under which conditions to allow abortion while still maintaining this
safeguard
Woman must visit social worker from family protection for counseling on
abortion, its risks, and contraception; must sign statement admitting in "crisis
situation; must wait three days before procedure; husbands must attend, if
possible; hospitals and doctors decide whether they will perform abortions;
price of procedure doubled; parental consent for those under 18 (Gal, 1994)
Support emergency contraception (CRLP Worldwide)
1940 abortion law
Illegal under all circumstances except when pregnancy endangers the mothers
life or is the result of rape (Lupiya, 1998)
May 28, 1997 liberalized law considered unconstitutional on grounds that
human life is of fundamental value and protected from conception.
Reestablished 1993 anti-abortion law (Eberts, 1998).
Abortion allowed with parental authorization (for minor), in cases of rape and
incest, and fetal impairment
Polish Federation for Women and Planning submitted restrictive law to UN
committee; UN recommended it be changed because it presented a threat to
women's right to health2
The Polish Church submitted restrictive law just following institution of
democracy, failed but restrictive measure involving Church compromise
instituted in 1993
Support emergency contraception but costly and difftcult to obtain (CRLP
Worldwide)

The table shows a great degree of variation in the political influence of national
Churches with regard to abortion policy. The Spanish Church is characterized as least
influential because the liberalization the current abortion law is possible in the near
future. In 1998, a liberal bill allowing abortion in cases of severe personal, familial, or
social distress within the first trimester lost by a single vote in the Spanish legislature
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(Bosch, 1998). The push for a more liberal law, which is backed by public opinion,
suggests that the Church is engaging in a losing battle over abortion policy. The Spanish
Church has publicly declared its neutrality and rejection ofthe political sphere, but still
maintains a place in moral political debates. Its inability to prevent liberal abortion
legislation clearly shows the Church's lack of direct influence even in the moral arena,
despite the fact that the majority of Spaniards are Roman Catholic (Casanova, 1993).
The Hungarian Church ranks as more influential than the Spanish Church, despite
the fact that Hungary today has a more liberal abortion policy than Spain. Under
communism abortion was available on demand, suggesting Hungary's "liberal" abortion
policy has become more restrictive over time. As Susan Gal points out "there are other
aspects of the law that leave very much open the possibility of informal and structural
effects that could have restrictive consequences" (1994, p256). The 1956 Abortion
Admissibility Law provided abortion on demand until 1970s when the communist state
became concerned with the declining birth rate. In 1974 regulations required women to
appear before a committee prior to obtaining an abortion. Although the committee could
refuse to consent, in general it was simply a formality and abortion remained readily
available (Corrin, 1992). Keeping this legacy in mind, the Hungarian Constitutional
Court gave the parliament until the end of 1992 to codify an abortion policy which
neither outlawed abortion nor made it freely available (Moss, 1994). Thus, the
parliament was forced to create a relatively liberal law since it could not ban abortion and
86% of Hungarians favored a woman's right to an abortion (Corrin, 1994). Despite
concerns over the ability of the Hungarian population to replace itself, the liberal policy
was instituted3•

March 21, 1964 the Holy See is regarded as a non-member state permanent observer allowing it to
occasionally participate in General Assembly discussions and decisions and participate in UN International
Conferences. The Holy See, however, has no voting rights.
3The abortion debate in Hungary is very much motivated by the inability of the population to replace itself.
When viewed in this light, the abortion debate becomes a discourse of national survival and not solely an
issue of women's rights.
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The greater political influence of the Brazilian Church can be seen in the fact that
Brazil's highly restrictive abortion law has remained unchanged since 1940. Despite
high rates of illegal abortions and the inaccessibility of sufficient means of birth control,
organized and influential women's groups in Brazil have not sought to oppose the Church
on abortion issues. The legalization of abortion is generally seen as an "impossible
dream" by feminists (Waylen, 1994). The prestige of the Brazilian Church is further
,

exemplified by its enormous role in affecting the government's social policy. The Church
has established direct governmental links via the Brazilian Conference of Bishops
(CNBB) and recently created a popular social plan known as The Way to the New
Millennium
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The Catholic Church in Poland has been the most directly active in the political
realm of all the cases in this study. The Church has sponsored numerous anti-abortion
bills and many have been successful. On January 7, 1993, the Church sponsored an anti
abortion bill that passed allowing abortion only in cases of rape and incest, fetus damage,
and when a woman's life was at risk (Kulczycki, 1994). This bill established criminal
punishments for individuals found performing illegal abortions. When a liberalized anti..
abortion law was passed in 1996, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled it to be
unconstitutional in 1997. The court argued that human life is of fundamental value and
must be protected from conception (Eberts, 1998). The Polish Church has blocked
numerous referendum attempts to resolve the issue, even when 1.3 million signatures
were gathered (Hillar, 1995). Using the above criteria the Polish Church has
unequivocally established itself as the most influential among the cases.

"Way to the New Millennium" four year plan was introduced in 1997 by Church to focus on different area
of human rights each year.

4
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Explaining the Variance

Any number of factors can help to explain why Church influence might decline in
the aftermath of a transition from authoritarianism. The literature points to secularization
(Soper and Fetzer, forthcoming; Perez-Diaz, 1993; Casanova, 1990 and 1993; Martin,
1978); pluralization (Volenski and Grzymala, 1997; Mainwaring, 1986; Long, 1988); the
former regime type (Waylen, 1994; Ramet, 1997; Wolchik and Jaquette, 1998); the

-

extent to which the Church was associated with the former regime (Casanova, 1990 and
1993; Perez-Diaz, 1993); the influence of the Vatican (Della Cava, 1990 and 1993), the
religious mission of the Church (Mainwaring, 1986; Perez-Diaz, 1993); and the type of
transition that occurred (Waylen, 1994; Ramet, 1987). Secularization is a global trend so
it cannot explain variations across the four cases in this study. Likewise, increased
religious pluralism is a natural by-product of democratization and therefore affects all of
the selected cases. Denominational differences are controlled for in the research design,
as Catholicism is the dominant religion (65%+). The type of transition is held constant
throughout the study; all four cases have been described by scholars as "negotiated" or
"gradual" transitions (Waylen, 1994). The literature suggests the legacy of communist
and atheist rhetoric should create an initial surge of support for freedom of religion,
thereby giving the Church in post-communist systems greater political leverage than
Churches in former rightist authoritarian regimes (Perez-Diaz, 1993; Casanova, 1993;
Wolchik and Jaquette, 1998). The cases selected, however, include two formerly
communist countries (Poland and Hungary) and two countries with a rightist
authoritarian past (Brazil and Spain); and there is no correlation between the political
influence of the Church and the former regime type, the Brazilian Church is more
influential than the Hungarian Church.
Having eliminated several explanations throughout the case selection, three
factors remain as possible predictors of Church influence after democratic transition: the
degree of association between the Church and the former regime, the religious mission of
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the Church, and the influence of the International Church. The table below describes
these variables in each of the cases.

Poland
Church
Association
with Former
Regime

Religious
Mission
Influence of
the
International
Church

(most influence)
-little co-optation
of Church under
communism
-nurtured civil
society and
nationhood under
communism
-instrumental in
the transition to
democracy
-mission still
appears to be
national
-seen as means to
re-evangelize
Europe
-example for other
Churches dealing
with democratic
transition
-intervene in
Polish Church's
political outlook

Brazil

Hungary

-little co-optation
of Church
-nurtured civil
society and dissent
aimed at regime
-key in transition
to democracy

-Church associated
with communist
regime
-seen as a sell-out
to the regime in
the eyes of the
laity and religious
orders

-mission at both
the individual and
national level

-individual mission
-national mission
not spiritual but
financial
-no major
instances of
International
Church exerting
control or
influence

-liberation vs.
conservative
theology
-Vatican replacing
liberal bishops
with more
conservative-7 sup
pressing popular
church which was
created to be
politically active
and fight for
justice

Spain
(least influence)
-pillar of the
Francoist state
until the
documents of
Vatican II issued
(1962-65)

-serve spiritual
needs of individual

-no major
occurrences of
International
Church exerting
control or
influence

Influence in politics is greatest where the Church opposed authoritarian rule, sees its
mission as national, and is strongly influenced by and tied to the Vatican. The following
case studies more sufficiently explain why such a variation exists among the four national
Churches where Catholicism is undoubtedly the dominant religion.

Church and Former Regime: Friend or Foe?
Perhaps one of the single most important indicators of political influence is the
degree to which the Church fostered civil society under the former regime. In the Polish
and Brazilian cases, the Church was highly involved in protecting the societal
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organization within the country and in many cases the Church allowed opposition forces
to meet within the church. In Spain, and to a lesser degree in Hungary, the Church was
the puppet of the former regime. The Church's association with oppressive regimes acts
as an indicator of the public perception of the Catholic Church. In countries where the
Church was a leader in the democratic movement, the laity easily view the Church as
reformist, adaptable, and "for the people". In cases where the Church is psychologically

-

associated with the former regime in the mind of the public, the Church is seen as more
traditional or conservative, static, and statist, thus distancing the Church from the laity.
In Poland the Church has long been the protector of Polish nationhood. David
Martin rightly observes that "where religion is imposed from above by a conqueror it is
thereby weakened, whereas when it is the focus of resistance it is thereby strengthened"
(Casanova, 1990, p25). Throughout partitioning and the rule of many conquerors, the
Polish nation has been protected by the people and the Church. Jose Casanova observes
that, historically, "given the absence of a Polish state, the crucial factor [was] the
identification of church and nation at a time when the Catholic Church [was] the only
institution able somewhat to cut across the partition of Prussian, Russian and Austrian
Poland" (1990, p26). This fusion of Polish nationalist sentiment and Catholicism took
place in spite of Vatican disapproval of Polish uprisings.
When communism took hold in Poland in 1944, the communist regime
continually tried to break the bond between Catholicism and the nation without success.
The regime failed to incorporate the Church into the state machinery. The communist
party attempted to exert selective repression on certain members of the Catholic
hierarchy. However, the use of coercive means actually consolidated the Church's
position by transforming the repressed figures into national heroes or martyrs. The
regime attempted to re-write history, to make the Church appear as the enemy to Polish
nationhood, privatize religion, and even create a "socialist man" adherent to a new civil
religion (Ramet, 1997). In essence nearly every tactic used by communist leaders to
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weaken the influence of the Church failed, allowing the Polish Church to counteract the
socialization efforts of the regime and increase the number and strength of its believers.
Not only did the Church escape attempts to weaken its hold on Polish society but it also
put up a formidable resistance to further encroachment ofthe state, inevitably ending in
the downfall of the communist state. The Polish Church over time has protected the
sense of Polish nationhood, rejected association with communism, and played a major

-

role in the formation of a democratic state. Therefore, the Polish Church maintains it has
a rightful place within the political sphere, in a way which the Spanish or Hungarian
Church does not.
In comparison with Polish Catholicism, the Brazilian Church has been a
historically weak institution. In general the evangelization of Brazil was left to religious
orders, particularly the Jesuits. In 1890 the Brazilian Church was officially separated
from the state. The Church was against the principle of separation; however, the
liberation from state controls was welcomed. Nonetheless, the absence of state funding
took its toll on the Brazilian Church and it was not until Vargas came to power in 1937
that the Church, under Dom Leme, was able to reestablish close ties with the state.
Under Leme, Catholic Action took hold and advocated the christianizing ofthe elite in an
effort to gain access to the state (Schneider, 1991). The Church was certainly not as
entangled in the state as the Spanish Church under Franco, but it still maintained ties to
the state until the mid-l 960s. In the early 1960s the Brazilian Conference of Bishops
(CNBB) contained an elite core of progressives who attempted to adopt radical reform
from above in association with the radical Catholic Left and the Popular Action party.
The conservative members of the CNBB saw this progressiveness as unrepresentative,
but in 1964 a military coup ended all hopes of radical reform from above or below
(Mainwaring, 1986). In the early 1970s "the People's Church" emerged in Brazil, acting
as a bastion of opposition to authoritarian rule. The Church fought for reform under
authoritarian rule, specifically the end of state violence, agrarian reform, and the
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colonization of the Amazon (Mainwaring, 1986). While the history in Poland and Brazil
differ, both Churches opposed the regime and were seen as the purveyors of reform and
democracy. The Polish Church has battled in the name ofthe nation for centuries;
however, the Brazilian Church has just recently begun to fight for the people.
In both Poland and Brazil the Church acted as a voice for the people when
regimes silenced both civil and political society. In Brazil, the most widely noted form of
political influence by the Brazilian Church has been the creation of base Christian
Communities (CEBsi. CEBs were more influential in Brazil than any other Latin
American country for several reasons. First, the poor were leaving the Catholic Church
and converting to Protestant sects and Afro-Brazilian religions (Vasquez, 1998).
Traditional clerical means were no longer capable oftending to the spiritual needs of the
Brazilian population. The Brazilian Church has always been short on priests, given the
size and population of Brazil. CEBs became an alternative model of the Church
promoting self-organization and communal growth, while requiring minimal clerical
supervision (Casanova, 1990). CEBs essentially promoted participation at various levels
giving the Brazilian people the tools they needed to change the world they were
accustomed to. During the transition, the Church encouraged political participation,
voting, and was accused of favoring leftist parties such as the Workers' Party (PT).
Because the Church fostered civil society under authoritarianism it has generally kept its
privileged position within Brazilian society.
In Poland, the Church was more politically active beginning in 1976 when an
amendment was added to the constitution giving the communist party a monopoly within
the state. The Church and the people protested against the amendment since it implied a
social contract ensuring personal rights provided citizens abided communist doctrine.
This action eventually led to the formation of the Workers Defense Committee (KOR)
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and culminated in the emergence of Solidarity which was symbolic of the nation,
democracy and the workers. Catholic intellectuals unified with workers, students and
artists against the communist enemy. These intellectuals played an instrumental role in
the founding of the KOR and have remained official and unofficial advisers to the
movement (Taras, 1995).
The Polish Church was eager to capitalize on its high support by the public and
carve out its political niche in the new democratic order. Many churches became
campaign headquarters for Solidarity in the semi-free 1989 elections. In the 1990
presidential elections the Church had a vested interest in two Catholic candidates, Lech
Walesa and Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Walesa was favored mainly because Mazowiecki was
espoused to be more liberal (Eberts, 1998). While the Polish Church remained officially
neutral, individual priests had no qualms in leading parishioners to vote one way or
another (Eberts, 1998). While such political activism has since led to divisions within the
hierarchy and the laity of the Polish Church, the public initially embraced the activism of
the Church understanding the role it played in the reform process (Eberts, 1998).
In Hungary, by way of contrast, the Church has never played the role of the
dominant Church as is so characteristic in Poland. During the Reformation, the
Hungarian Church allied itself with the Hapsburg government to fend off the threat of
Protestantism. This required the Church to fuse with a secular state that set up
commissions to check the Church's power (Moss, 1994). The Church generally
submitted to state enforced restrictions and in 1781 the Edict of Toleration came to pass
allowing Protestantism to re-emerge. In 1867 during the Ausgleich, which produced a
dual monarchy, Catholicism remained the state religion in the Austrian portion of the
dynasty but not in the Hungarian half (Ramet, 1987). Following the Ausgleich, the
government provided subsidies to Protestant Churches but none to the Catholic Church
5 CEBs are small (10-70 members) grassroots organizations sponsored by the Church. Meetings are used to
discuss scripture and the bearing it had on members lives. These groups emphasize equality and
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forcing the Church to cooperate with the government. It is not surprising the Hungarian
Church simply accepted communist control, because there was little history of real
institutionalization. This pattern of acquiescence and weakness continued into the late
communist era. In the 1970s and 1980s the Hungarian opposition forces received little
support from the Church. As a consequence, when the communist regime collapsed in
1989, the Church was excluded from roundtable negotiations (Moss, 1994). The
Church's past has discredited it as a political force and separated it from participation in
nationalist and right wing populist movements. The failure of the Christian Democrats to
win seats in the 1998 election testifies to this point.
The Spanish Church is even less influential than the Hungarian though it has no
significant religious rivals. The CIA World Factbook claims 99% of Spaniards consider
themselves Catholic, but other statistics suggest 94-95% are Catholic (World Values
Survey, 1991). Victor Perez-Diaz describes the alliance between the Church and the
Francoist state as the realization of a denominational state. The Church's ideal was a
state "consistent in its structure, its legislation and its civil servants, subordinate to it in at
least some areas, and providing resources for the Church to carry out its objectives"
(1993, pI32). The Francoist state met these criteria allowing the Church to share in the
decision-making process with regards to education and the controlling of social customs.
The state supported the Church financially. It is estimated that the state gave the Church
nearly 5 million pesetas per year in the early 1970s, the equivalent of a medium sized
ministerial budget (Perez-Diaz, 1993). Franco's regime depended on the Church for
legitimacy both within the country and the international community (Gunther, 1986). So,
the Spanish Church essentially aligned itself with the Francoist regime in order to receive
a political voice and the resources necessary to effectively assert its platform of National
Catholicism.

participation. While not inherently political, many groups espoused Liberation Theology (Gautier).
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In 1971 following years of internal division over the Church's religious
orientation, Archbishop Enrique y Tarac6n was nominated as president of the
Conferencia Episcopal. He was a moderate and was extremely influential in moving the
Spanish Church to break ties with the regime and embrace liberal pluralism. By 1975,
the Spanish Church was utilizing rhetoric associated with freedom and liberty, estranging
itself from the regime which had based itself on Catholic ideals (Gunther, 1986). The

-

Church increasingly fostered a relationship with the democratic opposition. According to
Perez-Diaz this was possible only because the Church leaders of the opposition had
discarded their anti-religious/anti-clerical attitudes, a new political class to some extent
had been formed by the Church, and the Church deliberately did not form or support a
Christian Democratic party. Although the Church played an important role in the
transition from 1975-1978, nothing can erase its huge influence within the Francoist
regime or its role in the Civil War. The Spanish Church understood this and
appropriately proclaimed its political neutrality. The Church accepted the principles of a
non-denominational state and religious freedom. The Church was recognized as a
"sociological fact" within the 1978 constitution, thus acknowledging the symbolic role
the Catholic Church has maintained within Spanish society.
While the Spanish Church battles to maintain its religious core of believers, its
political decline has been taken more gracefully than in the other cases. The Spanish
Church has acknowledged its mistakes and tried to heal the wounds created by its role in
the Civil War. The withdrawal of the Spanish Church from the political realm while
certainly attributable to an increase in consumerism, secularization, and the decline in
morality, the Church's association with the Franco regime should not be overlooked.

Religious Mission
Scott Mainwaring claims that the way the Church intervenes in politics depends
fundamentally on how it perceives its religious mission (1986). One would expect those
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national Churches seeing their role as moral and religious providers to individuals would
seek a less overtly political role. National churches perceiving their religious mission as
the guardians of religion and morality among an entire nation or society would tend to be
more involved in politics. This, although, is not to say that a Church involved in politics
at the institutional level will be publicly supported. The intense politicization of a
Church can have negative repercussions ifits actions are not supported by the laity.
Victor Perez~Diaz extends Mainwaring's assertion by outlining the major
components of a religious message. The religious message of a church can be reduced to
three elements, " a message of meaning, a message of salvation, and a message of moral

community, all of which take as their point of reference a god or other supernatural
figures, which the church represents, from which it receives its spiritual resources and
with which it mediates" (1993). Meaning refers to an explanation for the causes of the
apparent chaos of reality, i.e. life, death, unexplained events. Salvation "is not only
setting the mind at ease by creating order but also, and more especially, a case of
satisfying human affections and emotions" (Perez-Diaz, 1993). Finally the moral
community involves a group ofthe faithful both visible and invisible, i.e. clergy,
believers, God, virgins, and saints. Perez-Diaz unduly limits this category by failing to
suggest that the bounds of this moral community are not set. It seems likely that a moral
community could include society as a whole if the Church felt it was their duty to
"moralize" the national society and not just the faithful. The moral community is the
most beneficial component ofPerez-Diaz's definition of a religious message because it
establishes the scope of influence a church is seeking within a democracy.
Clearly during the protracted transition from Communist rule, the Polish Catholic
Church never wavered as the protector of civil society and the Polish nation. The Church
under communism was the symbol for freedom and dissent (Casanova, 1992; Taras,
1995). Mirella Eberts writes,
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Poles flocked to the Churches in symbolic opposition to the
communist authorities, as they had done for centuries whenever
Poland was under foreign occupation. During the turbulent
Solidarity years, Catholic and non-Catholic activists and
intellectuals gathered in churches across the country. The Church
once again became the symbol of freedom and firmly established
itself as the only legitimate authority in the country. (1998)
In May 1989, just following the collapse of communism, the Sejm passed numerous
measures relating to the position of the Church. The Statute on Freedom of Conscience
and Creed reintroduced freedom of religion, including the right to express or keep silent
on religious matters. The Statute on Social Insurance of Clergymen put the financial
burden of the clergy almost entirely on the state. The Church was given autonomy from
the state thus permitting the Church to make its own hierarchical appointments. The
Church was offered major tax concessions and within a year of the fall of communism it
had won the battle to reintroduce religious instruction in public schools (Eberts, 1993).
The legal concessions bestowed on the Polish Church were the culmination of its battle
against foreign domination and communism. The Church successfully protected Polish
nationality and was granted a variety oflegal rights during the transition. The Polish
Church interpreted these concessions as supportive ofthe dominant political role that it
maintained for so many years. Thus, the Polish Church secured a position as a dominant
institution giving it the means to promote itself at the national level.
In the Brazilian case, under the vision of "New Christendom," the Church sought
to combat "alien" ideologies with organizations that targeted the "faithless" segments of
society. This neo-Christendom vision took place throughout Latin America and Spain
from the late l800s to the 1950s mainly targeting university students, middle-class youth,
urban professionals and urban workers. The thrust behind this ideology was the Catholic
Action movement (Gill, 1998). The neo-Christian ideology was founded upon a dualistic
conception of history, one secular and the other religious. This model attempted to plant
Christian values within the secular world in an effort to inject it with religious principles.
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However, the documents of Vatican 11 6 reversed this ideology suggesting God created the
world and only one history exists. Such an ideological shift caused crisis in Brazil where
the Catholic Action movement had finnly implanted organizations in universities and the
labor force. The Brazilian Church quickly adapted to the ideology of Vatican II creating
a model of grassroots organization with such innovations as CEBs. The Brazilian Church
in the 1960s and 1970s was the model of a progressive church. Membership in CEBs
was nearly one million and there was a 700% increase in the number of seminarians
during this period (Cleary, 1997). In the 1980's, under the direction of Pope John Paul II,
the Vatican began to curtail the progressiveness of the Brazilian Church by continually
replacing progressive bishops with conservative bishops.
Such a move caused a crisis of religious ideology and vision within the Brazilian
Church. The first faction was conservative, according to theologian Clodovis Boff, and
demanded centralization, hegemony and obedience within the Brazilian Church. This
vision focused on the Church as an institution while the progressive faction characterized
the church as a "servant within society requiring the church and its laity to be more
participatory." Yet Edward L. Cleary proposes the days of partisan politics and religious
divide are ending in Brazil as shown by the four year plan introduced by the Brazilian
Church in 1997 known as the Way to the New Millennium. Under this plan the Brazilian
Church proposes to focus on a different area of human rights each year, beginning with
civil rights and ending with economic rights. What this suggests is that the Brazilian
Church has sought to build civil society and bolster the sense of Brazilian citizenship and
democracy. There has also been a reduction ofthe public role ofthe Brazilian Church
since the progressiveness ofthe 1970s and concessions are still given to the tendency

Vatican II theology "stressed a very different notion ofthe Church as the people of God, assigned a more
important role to the laity, redefmed the authority of the Pope over the whole Church and the bishops over
the diocese" (Mainwaring, 1986). Vatican II theology stressed the need for social justice and vowed to
help the less fortunate, this came to be known as the option for the poor. The International Church
accepted pluralism and rejected all forms of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. The Church accepted the
principles ofliberal democracy (Perez-Diaz, 1993).
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toward centralization in the Church. Clovodis Boff cites a direct link between the
president of the CNBB and the government since 1991 to coordinate and advise on
governmental efforts to resolve social questions. The Brazilian experience of ideological
division and recent reconciliation has led the Church to acquire prestige through its effort
to improve the social conditions within the country rather than through a privileged status
within the government (Cleary, 1997).
The Hungarian Church undoubtedly appeals to individuals rather than the entire
nation, mainly due to its past connections with the communist party. The Catholic
hierarchy initially supported Hungary's alliance with Nazi Germany mainly because it
gained land and people through the alliance. Eventually, however, the Church resisted
the government's control through the Catholic Social People's Union. Under communist
rule all Catholic orders were banned, half of the seminaries were closed, and all Church
appointments were required to be approved by the State Office of the Church (Gautier,
1998). The committed members of the Catholic order and the laity felt the institutional
Church sold out to the communist regime. Those orders dissolved on legal grounds by
the regime continued underground. Base communities stepped in to act as a substitute for
the withdrawal of the institutional Church. Thus, with the institutional Church severely
weakened during the communist rule and the belief among the public and laity that the
withdrawal was self-imposed, it is no wonder the Hungarian Church has maintained little
political influence since the establishment of democracy. In 1989 when the Hungarian
communist government met with the leaders of the major opposition factions for
roundtable negotiations, the Church was absent (Moss, 1994). The Hungarian Church's
apathy, the high levels of secular values, and the mental association linking the Church to
Hungary's communist past have forced the Church to reestablish its legitimacy as an
institution through individuals.
The religious mission of the Spanish Church is not as explicit as the other cases.
As in the case of Brazil, the Spanish Church has historically fought against modernity.
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With the acceptance of religious pluralism and modernity under Vatican II the Spanish
Church was faced with ideological crisis. The Spanish Church could have either reverted
to a model of evangelical simplicity, universal love, and downplayed the Church's
institutional aspects or reverted to a model of national Catholicism whereby it continued
to impose Christian morals on the whole of the Spanish nation. The Spanish Church
chose the former. Its present ideological approach places more emphasis on the personal
and ethical constructs of religion. The Spanish Church maintained its political neutrality
following democratization, but its personal and ethical emphasis has left the Church
space to justify involvement in politics over moral and ethical issues, as shown in the
case of abortion policy. Over time the Church has "devalued the laity's expectations and
aspirations for achieving their salvation through sacramental practices" and stressed
temporal activities (Perez-Diaz, 1993). The Spanish Church struggles to maintain
influence even within the realm of private morality, the likelihood of it adopting a more
national religious mission is unlikely.

Influence of the International Church

The influence of the International Church is an important variable affecting the
political influence of national Churches. As the earlier table shows, there appears to be a
connection between a higher degree of Vatican involvement and high levels of Church
influence in politics. Levels of cooperation between national Churches and the
International Church, however, vary over time and region. The relationship between the
International Church and the political influence of a national Church is a tenuous one and
a more thoughtful analysis of post-transition political influence would need to be pursued
to fully understand such a relationship.
Within the four cases, only the Polish and Brazilian Church have been highly
influenced by the international Catholic hierarchy. Brazil, as previously mentioned, has
been chided by the Vatican for its increasingly progressive role in social politics in
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Brazil. Poland, on the other hand, being the first ofthe Central and Eastern European
countries to obtain democracy was chosen by Pope John Paul II to be an example for
other Catholic Churches experiencing a democratic transition. Poland was also seen as a
means to re-evangelize Europe, thus reuniting the East and West (Eberts, 1998).
Under the former communist regime, official ties between the Vatican and Poland
were severed. One of the first actions made within the new Polish democracy was the
renewal of full diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Poland on July 17, 1989.
More importantly, the Polish Church was seen by the Vatican, specifically Pope John
Paul II, as a means to reincorporate Central and Eastern Europe into the world church and
to create a unified Europe. The selection of the Polish Church as an example for other
Central and Eastern European countries belonging to the third wave of democratization is
not surprising considering the Pope's Polish roots. The establishment of democracy
within Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries has given the
International Church a clean slate and a chance to reform the present International
Church and its relations with national churches. Ralph Della Cava has cited three basic
goals of the International Church: (1) greater centralization within the papacy and the
Roman Curia1; (2) the imposition ofa unilaterally redefined doctrinal orthodoxy;
(3)greater uniformity in liturgy and ecclesiastical organization (1990 and 1993). The
Vatican has remained active in Poland in order to curb the Polish Church's excessive
political role. The Polish Church has not fought Vatican control. Just following the
institution of democracy, a group of Catholic lawyers drafted a restrictive abortion with
the hope of receiving quick legislative approval. The Polish Church expected to give the
ratified law to Pope John Paul II as a gift during his first visit to democratic Poland
(Eberts, 1998). Although the bill failed, a restrictive law was eventually instituted.

The Roman Curia is the collection of ministries for governing the International Church (Della Cava,
1993).
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Within the Brazilian case, the Roman Curia have retained the right to control
episcopal nominations and even the nomination of bishops rather than allowing the
CNBB this right. At the national and diocesan levels, the Roman Curia has created
episicopal commissions for doctrine within Brazil. These were designed with the intent
purpose of curbing doctrinal dissent characteristic of the Brazilian Church under the
policies of Vatican II (Della Cava, 1993). Beginning in the post-war era, the
International Catholic Church has granted the Brazilian Church, along with many others,
control of their own resources as well as choice over the direction of their allocation and
disbursement of funds. Nonetheless, this was reversed in the mid to late 1970s. This was
the result ofthe Vatican's increasingly dismal financial situation and the misuses of
philanthropy in the eyes ofthe Vatican (Della Cava, 1990). The requirements of
hierarchical obedience from the upper to lower echelons ofthe Catholic Church, has
created tension within the Brazilian Church. The Church, known for its innovative grass
roots religious and social movements, has increasingly resisted its required obedience.
Conflicts continually arise over ideology and resources. Financially, Brazil is one ofthe
main benefactors ofthe Vatican's budget since it houses the largest Catholic population·
in the world and many Brazilians rely on the Church for social and financial support
(Della Cava, 1990). It is likely this will become a concern in Central and Eastern Europe
as well, given the current financial situations within many of these states. It is plausible
the lower echelons of the hierarchy will begin soliciting aid outside the realm of the
Vatican. Thus the International Church has increasingly shown it is incapable of dealing
with all the repercussions of democratization and the new societal problems resulting
from it. With institutional and financial crisis continually looming over the International
Church, it is obvious it cannot support the programs capable of improving conditions in
these new democracies while simultaneously focusing on re-incorporating national
Churches into the international hierarchy in an effort to create a 'World Church'.
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Conclusions and Predictions

Each ofthe explanatory variables not only affects the Church's religious hold within
a new democracy, but they are also fundamental in explaining the Church's political
influence. These are in no way the only forces influencing the Church's political role
since transition but only those with the most relevance. As shown, Poland emerged from
the transition with a Catholic Church claiming a right to exert influence within the
political realm. It has successfully exerted this influence over policy issues ranging from
abortion to religious education to clerical funding. On the other end of the spectrum, the
Spanish Church emerged from the transition voluntarily choosing a position of neutrality.
Despite the variance between these two extremes of political influence, there is evidence
the Polish Church, and to a lesser extent the Brazilian Church, may decline in influence
over time for a variety of reasons.
With the centralization and reintegration efforts ofthe Vatican becoming increasingly
prominent, there seems to be an increasing strain on national Churches to pacify the
International Church while also accommodating the distinct needs of the laity. This will·
especially be the case in Churches where questions of secularization and plurality
continually threaten a Church (i.e. Poland and Brazil). Excessive interference of
International Church policies in the national context may create a rift between the
national Church and the citizenry. This could lead to a decline in influence over the laity,
which over time could diminish any direct political role of the Church (Della Cava, 1990
and 1993; Casanova, 1993). In both Brazil and Poland, it is unclear whether the Vatican's
influence has played a positive role. In Brazil, the Vatican interrupted a progressive
experience that potentially could have increased the position of the Catholic Church
within Brazil. In Poland, the Church's efforts to please the Vatican hierarchy may have
actually created a chasm between the laity and the Polish Church. This gap may be
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impossible to overcome, as the Polish people become more alienated from the Polish
Church.
The trend toward the inclusion of the laity is likely to increase tensions between
national Churches and the International Church. The Vatican's financial situation is dire,
as are its human resources. These international dilemmas stemming from secularization
and a general decline in church attendance have limited the International Church's
financial resources. However, there are signs the International Church may try to reach
out directly to the laity in an effort to diminish laity alienation. In March 2000, Pope
John Paul II publicly apologized for the Church's treatment of Jews and women, and its
role in the Crusades and the Inquisition. More recently the Pope made a highly
publicized tour of Israel. The increased visibility of the Pope and the willingness of the
International Church to apologize for its mistakes can be interpreted as the Church's
willingness to reach out to the people, thus acknowledging potential difficulties with its
centralizing stance. It is too soon to know, however, ifthe International Church is simply
bypassing national Churches by appealing to the laity or seeking to work with them.
Over time Churches must adapt to the market-like environment yielded by
democracy. This will inevitably require Churches to adopt a more individualist posture.
The present research suggests a reevaluation or redefinition of the Church's political role
is occurring. This means Churches are not only adapting to pluralism and the continual
presence of civil and secular values, but they are fundamentally changing the way they
participate in politics. This occurring not only in Churches that maintained close ties
with the former regime, but also in Churches that played an instrumental role in the
transition to democracy. Since the documents of Vatican II, the Brazilian Church has
protected the voice of the people through CEBs and conveyed social concerns to the
government. Although the Brazilian Church maintains a hybrid of individual and
institutional political influence, its concern for the laity surpasses that maintained by the
Polish Church. In Brazil, the vast majority of religious conversions have been from
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Catholicism to more laity-oriented denominations, mainly Pentecostals, suggesting a
rejection of the hierarchical structure of Roman Catholicism.
Poland has been unable downplay its direct political influence and been incapable
of playing by the democratic rules of the game. This was expressed in January 1993 when
the Polish episcopate journeyed to Rome for scheduled visits required by all Bishops
every five years. The visit clearly demonstrated the senior members of the Polish
episcopate had been unable or unsuccessful in defining a new style of public engagement.
Evidence of this was the slipping of the Church from the most trusted institution to the
fourth most trusted, falling behind even the army, the ombudsman and the police
(Wiegel, 1994). At this juncture, Pope John Paul II took action stating "the Church is not
a political party nor is she to be identified with any political party; she is above them,
open to all people of good will, and no political party can claim the right to represent her"
(Weigel, 1994). This suggests the religious doctrine of national Catholicism is being
replaced by the Vatican, specifically, Pope John Paul II. Since the Pope's clear statement
in 1993, the episcopate has issued a national pastoral letter read in all Polish churches
stating it was the laity's role to carry Christian values into the public sphere and not the·
role of the institutional church. With public opinion increasingly pitted against the Polish
Church's carryover of former nationalist ideology, it is likely that the Polish Church will
be forced to offer a more personal religious stance in the future and distance itself from
the political realm.
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